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Abstract 
Shared resources often engender environmental conflict. This is because the activities of some groups of users 
of a resource are often detrimental to others. This paper discusses the relationship between property rights and 
environmental conflicts in Africa. It illustrates this relationship both at intra-state as well as at inter-state levels. 
Gender relations and property rights are also discussed given that women, who undertake about 80% of farm 
work on the continent, are not accorded equal say as men in resource ownership and resource management. 
The paper suggests how the problem of resource ownership can be addressed in order to minimize or prevent 
environmental conflicts and promote development at country as well as at continental level. 
 
 Introduction 
ince time immemorial, rural 
communities in Africa have made 
use of common property resources (CPRs), 
which include inter alia lakes, rivers, wetlands, 
rangelands and forests. In most colonial and 
post-colonial Africa, the introduction and 
application of the government or private 
property management systems have ignored or 
sidelined the locally adapted, time-tested, 
subtle and complex common property resource 
use practices and management systems 
obtaining among most of the African rural 
communities. These modern resource 
management systems have eroded and in some 
cases completely rendered the traditional 
modes of resource exploitation obsolete. This 
was despite the fact that modern property 
rights regimes such as state governance and 
private property regimes are not viable options 
because many of the resources under the CPRs 
class are nonexclusive in nature (Magrath, 
1989 cited in Berkes, 1993).  
 The imposition of the modern 
management systems in the utilization of CPRs 
has therefore led to the inevitable degradation 
of the resources because these systems lack a 
consensually agreed set of conventions, norms 
and guidelines. This has resulted in 
environmental conflicts as developing 
communities ignore the modern management 
systems, which they view as alien and 
therefore interference in their way of life. 
Among the most common causes of CPR 
related conflicts are land entitlements, water 
rights and access to fuel wood supplies. The 
degradation and depletion of these resources 
further intensifies conflict as the resource base 
shrinks to accommodate more users given the 
ever-growing population. It is therefore 
important to plan and introduce management 
systems that ensure sustainable exploitation of 
CPRs to reduce the rate of their continued 
decline. This paper discusses both intra-state 
and inter-state property rights and 
environmental conflicts in Africa. The gender 
aspect to the ensuing discussion is also 
considered before recommendations towards 
possible better management of CPRs are 
proposed. 
The concepts of CPRs, property rights and 
environmental conflict  
 The term common property resources 
(CPRs) are often used synonymously with 
common pool resources (Tevera and Mukora, 
2001). These terms connote resource types or 
facilities that are owned by an identifiable 
community or a group of people and are de 
facto, if not de jure, accessible to and jointly 
utilized by all members of the community. 
Such resources include but are not restricted to 
fish, wildlife, forests, grazing lands, ground 
water and rivers.  
 Common Property rights refer to the 
laws and rules governing the management of 
natural resources that are not owned by a 
single entity, person or family and access to 
which is limited to an identifiable community 
of users who can exclude others and regulate 
use (Tevera and Mukora, 2001). These rights 
have also been defined by Hackett (1998) as 
the laws and rules that govern access, 
withdrawal (use of resource units), 
management (how and when the resource is 
accessed or maintenance is performed or use is 
monitored), and exclusion (determining who 
can and cannot access or use the resource). The 
holders of these rights are sometimes known as 
"proprietors," and management and alienation 
(sale of the resource) rights are usually 
exercised in a collective-choice context along 
with other proprietors. The main challenge 
associated with the management of CPRs is the 
difficulty in effectively enforcing the laws and 
rules that govern the resources so as to exclude 
or control access of potential users and also the 
fact that each user is capable of subtracting 
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from the welfare of all other users (Berkes, 
1993). The resource classes that fall into the 
category of CPRs therefore run a risk of being 
depleted and degraded despite the existence of 
the governing rules and laws. 
 The concept of conflict encompasses a 
broad spectrum of empirical phenomena 
ranging from disputes between individuals to 
wars between states. An environmental 
conflict is a conflict caused by the 
environmental scarcity of a resource, which is, 
caused by a human-made disturbance of its 
normal regeneration rate (Libiszenski, 1992). 
Environmental scarcity can result from the 
over stressed ecosystem’s carrying capacity. 
The quarrels between radical environmentalists 
and industry can as well be called 
“environmental conflicts” such as wars over 
fresh water stocks (Libiszenski, 1992). 
Environmental conflicts thus manifest 
themselves as political, social, economic, 
ethnic, religious, ideological, and territorial or 
conflicts over resources or national interests 
among others. 
 The activities of some groups of users 
of a resource can be detrimental to others. For 
example, one of the most pervasive kinds of 
fisheries conflicts in the world concerns that of 
small-scale inshore fisheries against large-
scale operations such as trawlers (Berkes, 
1989). The appearance of powerful outside 
interests often combines with the 
disappearance of community-based 
management systems. The commons dilemma 
develops when there are too many users to a 
limited resource. Allocative disorder arises 
when the limits to access and /or the right-to-
use are under specified or not enforced and 
there are demands on the ecosystem that 
conflict with sustainability or other users, 
leading to the possibility of conflict and 
degeneration of the resource (Berkes, 1989). 
 The actual strength of a right depends 
on whether it is considered legitimate locally, 
whether it is enforceable and whether it can be 
protected from other people’s claims. Where 
titles and other statutory rights are rejected 
locally, they may be very difficult to enforce 
(Hilhorst, 2002). Moreover, usufruct rights that 
are embedded in customary systems can 
provide sufficient guarantees for production 
and do not hinder investment. Cotton in the 
Sahel, for example, which is an important 
export crop, is overwhelmingly grown on 
fields managed by customary tenure systems 
(Hilhorst, 2002). 
Intra-state property rights and 
environmental conflicts 
 The experiences of the Basarwa people 
in the hands of the Botswana government give 
a good appreciation of the relationship 
between property rights and environmental 
conflicts in Africa. This can be demonstrated 
using the following two examples: Firstly, in 
Botswana, land policy allows for three forms 
of land tenure, that is, state land (which prior 
to independence in 1966 was referred to as 
Crown land), tribal land and freehold land. 
Non-tribal land included land inhabited by 
tribes or communities not “officially 
recognized” by the colonial government such 
as the Basarwa people who are living in the 
remote Kalahari Desert. When the Kalahari 
Desert was declared Crown land, the Basarwa 
and other inhabitants became unlawful 
occupiers on their traditional lands. 
 The major implication of the 
declaration was the denial of the land 
entitlements to specific groups and this 
contributed to the marginalization still being 
experienced by the Basarwa (Mogwe and 
Tevera, 2000). Central Kalahari Game Reserve 
(CKGR) was established in areas formally 
occupied by the Basarwa with no 
entrenchment of any rights for the Basarwa 
and available evidence suggest that the 
Basarwa were coerced by government to move 
and had done so due to fear of possible 
reprisals if they remained in the CKGR 
(Mogwe and Tevera, 2000). However, some 
communities have, nevertheless, refused to 
move, arguing that the land belongs to them as 
the indigenous people of the area whose arrival 
predated that of the Bantu-speaking peoples in 
the country. 
 Secondly, under customary law in 
Botswana, individuals are entitled to be 
allocated land according to need, which is 
generally interpreted to mean their ability to 
use the land. However, the rural poor like the 
Basarwa inevitably lack the capacity to utilize 
the land productively due to their marginal 
location and an acute shortage of resources 
such as draught power. 
 Government interpretation of land use 
patterns as confined to the sedentary 
communities displays little appreciation for the 
hunter-gatherer land uses, effectively 
discriminating against the Basarwa. Due to the 
lack of recognition of the rights of the 
Basarwa, much of their traditional land 
territories were allocated to other groups for 
use as ranches or cattle posts (Mogwe and 




Tevera, 2002). The result has been resentment 
of government and land disputes with occupier 
sedentary communities coupled by the 
intensification of land and resource use 
conflicts and the subsequent reduction in 
wildlife numbers, diminishing of veld products 
and intensification of poverty among the 
Basarwa community. 
 At the centre of environmental 
conflicts in Namibia, lies a land tenure system 
that was based on an equitable distribution of 
land along racial lines (Moyo, et al, 1993). 
This land tenure system mirrors land tenure 
systems which prevailed in other African 
countries such as pre-independence Zimbabwe, 
Kenya and Zambia. 
 Prior to independence in Namibia, 
white settlers, who constituted just 8% of the 
population owned and held freehold title to 
60% of the agricultural land (Moyo et al, 1993. 
The land tenure system gave whites freedom to 
purchase or sell land and to borrow money 
from leading institutions using their farms as 
collateral. In sharp contrast, 40% of national 
land held by blacks in the ‘ homelands’ could 
not be sold or purchased freely because it 
belonged to the community. 
 Apart from being small, homelands 
and reserves are marginal areas characterized 
by poor climate, soils and inadequate 
resources. Environmental conflicts arose in 
Ovamboland when some unscrupulous 
commercial game ranchers who often graze 
their animals in the open rangelands in the 
rainy season illegally fenced part of the 
communal land thereby reserving their own 
grazing land for the dry season. This resulted 
in protests and in some cases increased cases 
of poaching by the communal people (Moyo et 
al, 1993).  
 In Tanzania, there are 4 types of land 
tenure systems. These are government 
leaseholds; rights of occupancies; customary 
land tenure laws and the collective tenure 
systems. However, land tenure systems in 
pastoral areas can be treated as a special case 
(Berkes, 1989). 
 Most of the pastoralists use communal 
grazing areas and cattle are shifted to other 
areas with more pasture if drought occurs in 
the more arid regions. Usually these 
pastoralists return when vegetation recovers. 
This migration type of grazing enables 
pastoralists to use their land more sustainably. 
However, arable land has expanded in 
response to demand due to population growth, 
thus causing the shrinkage of pastureland. 
Consequently, overstocking has become a 
problem in places like Dodoma, Arusha and 
Mwanza, forcing pastoralists to migrate 
permanently to other regions like Iringa, 
Rukwa and the coastal regions where pasture is 
available for most of the year (Moyo et al, 
1993). The local people in these regions, 
mainly the sedentary peasants have conflicting 
relationships with migrant pastoralists, 
especially disputes and fights when cattle 
accidentally stray and graze on growing crops. 
 In Zambia, there are 3 categories of 
land, namely state, reserve and trust lands 
(Moyo et al). Reserves, which are for the sole 
use of indigenous people are administered 
under customary or traditional land tenure 
systems. State land, on the other hand, is used 
exclusively for commercial farming, townships 
and the transport and communication 
infrastructure, and is administered under the 
statutory leasehold system. The trust land is 
reserved for the benefit of the population in 
future when the need arises, for example, for 
resettlement. The essence of customary 
systems is based on clearly defined user rights 
with the traditional authorities exercising 
overall jurisdiction and responsibility. The 
principle of a communality of interest in the 
land, most evident in the use of land for 
grazing, drawing water, firewood collection, 
hunting and fruit gathering is balanced by the 
recognition of the value of individual crop 
production. Land is considered to be owned by 
the community for the benefit of the 
community. 
 Traditional norms imply that a share in 
the village lands is viewed as a birthright by 
the descendants of the land-holding family 
regardless of where they leave (Moyo et al, 
1993). It is against this birthright notion 
attached to land that land disputes have arisen 
in cases where peasant farmers long to return 
to their ancestral land that was appropriated by 
colonial authorities. This has led to some 
instances where peasant farmers have resorted 
to squatting on state designated commercial 
farms or on abandoned commercial farms 
(Sakala Commission, in Moyo et al 1992). 
 In Ethiopia, the establishment of the 
Awash Valley Authority in 1962 and the 
investiture of land ownership were primarily to 
supervise development in the Awash Valley 
and settle the Afar pastoralists on two irrigated 
settlement schemes (Tevera and Moyo, 2000). 
This however deprived the Afar pastoralists of 
their right of seasonal movement. The Afar 
pastoralists graze their cattle close to the 
Ethiopian Journal of Environmental Studies and Management    Vol.2 No.1. 2009 
37 
 
riverbanks during the dry season and move the 
cattle onto the escarpments during the rainy 
season to escape floods and mosquitoes. They 
have a contractual system with the Highlanders 
who are cultivators. By selling some of their 
cattle and acting as herders for the cultivators, 
the Afar’s are able to pay an agreed amount to 
let their cattle graze on the cultivator’s crop 
residues. This arrangement of the rules 
governing the use of the commons satisfied 
both groups. 
 However, when the Afar pastoralists 
were settled to give way for commercial 
irrigation settlements, their seasonal migration 
from the lower plains to the highlands in the 
Awash Valley was discontinued. Yet this well-
established system of land use, migration and 
reciprocity with the highland cultivators was 
the way the Afar overcame the ecological 
constraints (Moyo et al, 1993). With the 
breakdown of the patterns of reciprocity came 
conflict between the Afar and the Highlanders 
over the access to land. 
 This example serves to illustrate how 
uninformed state interventions may destroy 
highly sophisticated and adapted methods of 
conserving natural resources following a 
tradition of long empirical experience and 
orally transmitted knowledge in local 
communities. 
 In Zimbabwe, most of the black 
population which fought the liberation war on 
the basis of reclaiming land rights tended to 
mobilize people’s energies and will as they 
thought that they were fighting for a just cause 
(Matondi, 2000). When the promises for land 
expropriation made by the liberation 
movements did not yield the desired results, 
the rural people were disappointed and this 
resulted in illegal farm occupations in the 
1998/99 agricultural season. 
 Another case of property rights versus 
environmental conflicts in Zimbabwe is in 
Bulilima and Mangwe districts where local 
households and outsiders collect mopane 
worms (amacimbi) without reference to 
anyone when they are in season (Madzudzo, 
1998). A constraint among local collectors is 
the fact that this is the time when they are busy 
working in the fields. Conflict arises when 
people from outside the district come; by 
public or private transport to collect mopane 
worms while the locals are busy in the fields. 
These outsiders collect mopane worms 
throughout the week which the locals cannot 
do because of their busy work schedule. The 
local community has thus been urging the 
Rural District Council (RDC) to exclude 
outsiders from harvesting amacimbi 
(Madzudzo, 1998). Local communities are 
constrained to deal with outsiders. They look 
up to the RDC to legitimize their claims to 
exclude outsiders. 
 Inter-state property rights and 
environmental conflicts. 
 Transboundary natural resources are 
those whose access and benefits are claimed by 
several nation states (Tevera and Mukora, 
2001). Shared water systems, migratory 
wildlife and establishing the extent of the 
watershed beyond national boundaries are 
some of the key problem areas 
(SADC/IUCN/SARDC, 2001). Examples of 
transboundary common resources in Southern 
Africa in the form of shared watercourses are 
the Zambezi River Basin, Limpopo River 
System and Orange River. 
In recent years, a number of serious conflicts 
have been observed in the Zambezi Basin. For 
example, the Zimbabwean and Zambian 
governments have been involved in a 
protracted conflict on the building of the 
Batoka Gorge Dam on the Zambezi River 
(Chiuta, 2000). Although this is one of the 
planned projects that have been on the cards 
for a long time, Zambia feels that the Batoka 
Gorge is not a priority for Zambians since they 
have not yet exhausted the current installed 
hydropower. Zimbabwe, on the other hand is 
desperate to boost its hydroelectric power 
through the construction of the dam and 
subsequent establishment of an HEP station. 
 In the Eastern Caprivi region of 
Namibia, conflict is escalating between 
tourism facility operators and fishing 
communities as more and more land on the 
river frontage is leased for tourism, and many 
fishing communities in both Namibia and 
Zambia are denied access to fishing grounds 
(Chiuta, 2000). A number of fishing 
communities in these areas have complained 
that their fishing nets are being destroyed by 
the tour operators, while the tour operators are 
arguing that these fishing communities are 
over fishing the waters, thereby affecting their 
angling business. 
 In the Chobe/Caprivi area, a cross-
border veld burning exists between Namibia 
and Botswana (Tevera and Moyo, 2000). In 
Botswana, the Chobe River frontage is used 
for tourism and wildlife, while in Namibia the 
frontage is used for communal agriculture and 
cattle grazing. Bird watching on a small 




wooden canoe (mokoros) is also an important 
activity. 
 Conflict between wildlife management 
and cattle grazing has resulted in Namibian 
cattle being shot on the Botswana side and 
stray wildlife from Chobe National Park killed 
in Namibia. In the same area, there is also a 
land dispute between the two countries over a 
small island called Sidudu (Chiuta, 2000). The 
tensions in this area are so intense that there is 
a permanent military presence. 
 In West Africa a bitter dispute has 
been raging between Nigeria and Cameroon 
over the Bakassi Peninsula, which both 
countries claimed as belonging to them. This 
was mainly because the island is oil-rich. The 
dispute was only settled after the intervention 
of the International Tribunal in The Hague. 
The peninsular was only given back to 
Cameroon in 2005.  
Property rights, environmental conflicts and 
gender 
 Gender issues are paramount in any 
discussion of property rights and 
environmental conflicts issues. Though women 
form the backbone of peasant agriculture, their 
lowly position in society hinders the 
realization of their full contribution to 
development efforts (Westing, 1986). Women, 
who undertake about 80% of farm work, are 
not accorded an equal say in their operations. 
Not only do men remain in charge of farm 
planning and management, but the land tenure 
systems condemns women to membership of a 
“landless class” (Ribbot, 2001). Even where 
land is acquired, women in several African 
societies are considered as legal minors and 
therefore not entitled to hold title deeds. In 
Zimbabwe, for example, although women are 
free to apply for land in the resettlement areas 
under Model A1 or Model A2 schemes, under 
Model A1 women face discrimination as they 
are required to submit their application  
through the traditional leadership which itself 
is male-dominated. The patriarchal tendencies 
have hindered women from accessing and 
owning land (Mgugu and Chimonyo, 2004). 
The A2 model requires a certain minimum 
amount of resources to be owned by the 
applicant indicating that they have the 
potential for commercial farming. This is 
despite the fact that most women own such 
resources through their husbands and that most 
rural household are headed by females.  
 Women often use CPRs intensively, 
collecting fuel wood and a wide range of other 
products from common lands, including 
grasses, medicines, fruits, nuts and berries. 
Harvesting strategies, such as where, when, 
how and with what intensity to gather and 
collect environmental resources determines the 
sustainability of the resources utilization. 
Regulation of resources use is more likely 
when the individual can reasonably expect to 
benefit in future from such restrictions (Boland 
and Platteau, 1996). For example, in West 
Africa women may be reluctant to invest in 
long term soil fertility improvement if they are 
not sure that they will be able to cultivate the 
same field the following year (Hilhorst, 2002). 
 Equally, they may be less eager to 
change fuel wood cutting techniques, leave 
unripe fruits to mature or protect a certain area 
if they fear that others will not respect such 
restrictions, reaping most of the benefits. For 
most rural people, access rights are obtained 
through customary rights systems (Lavigne, 
2002). Women’s claims to land within 
customary systems are generally obtained 
through their male members and hence may be 
considered secondary or derived rights. When 
access to a plot is granted to a woman in Niger, 
it may be on land which other male relatives 
do not want, because, for example, it is not 
very fertile, difficult to work, or not suitable 
for animal traction (Toulmin, 1997). 
 In some societies or families, women’s 
access to land may be constrained by their men 
fork’s fear for perceived independence that this 
access may generate. Some men in Cameroon, 
for example, refuse to give land to their wives 
since they fear they will lose a wife’s labour on 
their own fields or they may not like the idea 
women earning their own money (van den 
Berg, 1999) 
 Islamic law however recognizes a 
woman’s right to inheritance, although her 
share is usually smaller than that of a male 
relative. This has resulted in some women 
changing religion to improve their daughter’s 
rights to land, as has been the case in 
Cameroon (Cooper, 1997). 
Conclusion 
 From the preceding discussion, it 
would appear that restricting resource use 
through regulations could best enhance 
sustainability of CPRs. However, this require 
clarity about decision- making capacity over 
CPRs, as well as the presence of effective and 
respected institutions which oversee a fair 
application of rules, monitor results and 
propose changes. Customary authorities 
remain important for managing resource use 
effectively. Their authority in matters of tenure 
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as well as conflict resolution is recognized by 
resource users even when official legality is 
lacking. Land policy for CPRs should therefore 
take more account of local ways of dealing 
with land and emphasis should be on security 
of rights and prevention of conflict with 
institutions and authority systems becoming 
key. This would result in the reduction of both 
intra-state and inter-state environmental 
conflicts and a possibility of the achievement 
of the goal of sustainable development at all 
levels and in all regions across the African 
continent and the world.  In the light of 
the complexity of property right and 
environmental conflicts as discussed in this 
paper the following recommendation can be 
useful hints for stakeholders on environmental 
conflicts management in Africa: 
• The strengthening of existing 
community institutions of natural 
resource management through capacity 
building is essential, provided the 
resource users and appropriate 
stakeholders pay careful attention to 
the design of institutions. These should 
conform to the local forms of control 
and conflict resolution mechanisms 
(CAMPFIRE is a good example in 
Zimbabwe). The presence of 
government or outside institutional 
representatives evokes mistrust.  
• To address conflicts from shared water 
courses like the Zambezi River, 
appropriation rules must restrict when, 
how, where and how much an 
appropriator can withdraw from the 
river. These rules must include 
consideration of variations due to 
whether conditions and other local 
physical characteristics. The rules 
must be formulated by all states 
through a river basin commission like 
SADC’s soon- to- be- operational 
Zambezi River Basin Commission. 
• Still on shared watercourses it may be 
beneficial for riparian states to learn 
from best practices and international 
river commissions at work. These 
include, for example, The Rhine River 
Commission in Europe and The 
Mekong River Commission in Asia. 
• On gender, women must be given a 
greater role in decision-making about 
environmental issues at local, national 
and international levels. In particular, 
women’s organizations should be 
consulted on questions of local 
environmental planning as well as 
being involved in the development and 
implementation of national 
conservation and sustainable 
development strategies, and finally; 
• There is also need for gender 
mainstreaming in environmental 
planning and management issues given 
that women are the main users of 
CPRs and in the event that these 
resources are depleted, it’s the women 
who are hardest hit. 
• To reduce the bias of inheritance laws 
against women, legal reforms should 
concentrate on the promotion of joint 
ownership by husbands and wives of 
land and other property in areas where 
form of freehold are common. 
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